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In 1978 Guillermo Calvo published the paper “On the Time Consistency of Optimal Policy in a Monetary Economy”. This paper shows how a conflict between the interests of the current government with those of a future government, both of which share the same objective of maximizing social welfare, gives rise to a credibility problem. This seminal paper kickstarted a broad research agenda, which includes, for example, the problem of inflation stabilization, the unintended consequences of non-credible policies, balance of payments crises, sovereign debt crises, and the design of sustainable public debt management strategies. This conference will celebrate the “time consistency” paper´s 45th anniversary by gathering state-of-the-art research on the topic and bringing together academic researchers and policymakers who have to make decisions in environments without commitment.
Organizers. Andy Neumeyer (Universidad Torcuato Di Tella) and Martín Uribe (Columbia University)
Scientific Committee. Mauricio Cárdenas (Columbia University), María Victoria Murillo (Columbia University), Andy Neumeyer (Universidad Torcuato Di Tella), Paolo Pesenti (Federal Reserve Bank of New York), Martín Uribe (Columbia University), and Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé (Columbia University)
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